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COMMENTS
Invoking Summary Criminal Contempt ProceduresUse or Abuse? United States v. Dellinger*The "Chicago Seven" Contempts

I.

INTRODUCTION

In late August of 1968, while delegates to the Democratic National Convention were arriving in Chicago, a group of several thousand demonstrators gathered in the city's Lincoln Park to protest the
Convention, the Vietnam War, and the city's refusal to grant the
group a permit to hold rallies and marches during the Convention.
The week that followed was marred by violent confrontations between the demonstrators and the city's police.1 This violence in Chicago provided the impetus for an indictment by a federal grand jury
of the defendants in United States v. Dellinger.2
The Dellinger case came to trial on September 24, 1969, and continued until February 14, 1970. During the trial the defendants, their
counsel, and the presiding judge engaged in numerous heated and
vituperative exchanges. As soon as the jury had received its instructions and had retired to deliberate, District Judge Julius J. Hoffman
summarily cited the seven defendants3 and their two attorneys for
various instances of criminal contempt. The court, invoking summary powers granted by Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,4 read contempt specifications taken from the trial record
and gave each contemnor an opportunity to address the court solely
on the question of punishment. A separate sentence was imposed for
each contempt specification with the terms of imprisonment to run
consecutively.5 The contempt citations represented punishment for
• No. 69 C.R. 180 (N.D. ID., Feb. 14-15, 1970).
I. See, e.g., J. EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970).
2. No. 69 C.R. 180 (N.D. ru., Feb. 14-15, 1970). The grand jury returned an eightcount indictment charging eight defendants with conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2101
(Supp. V, 1965-1969) (inciting to riot) and 18 U.S.C. 23l(a)(l), (3) (Supp. V, 1965-1969)
(furtherance of civil disorders). Dellinger, Davis, Hayden, Hoffman, Seale, and Rubin
were also charged individually with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
Froines and Weiner were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 23l(a)(l) (Supp. V, 19651969).
3. The eighth defendant, Bobby Seale, was given a mistrial and sentenced to four
years imprisonment on summary contempt charges earlier in the trial. CONTEMP'f,
TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND RESPONSES OF THE CmCAGO

CoNSPIRACY IO, 35-36 (1970) [hereinafter CONTEMPT]. The remaining defendants were
quickly labeled the "Chicago Seven" by the news media.
4. Rule 42(a) provides:
••• Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt
shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
5. See note 55 infra.
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alleged misconduct that had occurred over the entire course of the
proceedings. The earliest cited instance of alleged contempt took
place on the first day of trial, 6 with the last incident occurring five
days before the jury retired. 7 Judge Hoffman implied that the contempt citations resulted from the aggregate of the contemnors'
actions during the trial. Addressing defense attorney Leonard Weinglass, the judge said: "I judge your whole attitude toward the Court.
. . . But I am obligated under the law to particularize these items of
contempt which I have.'' 8 Asserting the right to notice and a hearing
and to a jury trial before a different judge, the defense objected
strenuously to the contempt proceedings. The questions thus raised
present crucial and unresolved issues in the area of criminal contempt.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE

A.

LAW

OF CONTEMPT

Common Law

The power of courts to punish for contempt had its origin in
canon law and was borrowed by the English chancellors as they assumed equity jurisdiction.9 In the United States, the power to punish for contempt has been consistently viewed as a necessary and
integral part of the independence of the judiciary and therefore has
been deemed "inherent" in all courts.10 Since the contempt power
protects courts from insult and oppression while exercising their lawful duties, it is considered necessary for the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings. Moreover, this power is regarded as essential
to the enforcement of the judgments and orders upon which the administration of justice depends.11
The courts have classified contempts as "civil" and "criminal."
Civil contempt proceedings are remedial in nature and are intended
to force compliance with a court order that has been disobeyed.12 In
6. Weinglass (Attorney), Specification No. 1 (continuing argument when told to
cease). CONTEMPT, supra note 3, at 213.
7. Kunstler (Attorney), Specification No. 24. Id. at 202.
8. Id. at 239-40.
9. C. I.ANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURisn1cnoN 25-26 (2d ed. 1908). The
jurisdiction of both the canon-law courts and the equity courts was limited. To
enforce their decisions it was necessary that those tribunals be able to issue commands
and impose punishment in case of disobedience. Id. at 26.
10. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 505 (1873). In this case the Court stated
"[t]he moment the courts of the United States were called into existence • • • they
became possessed of [contempt] power." 86 (19 Wall) at 510.
11. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911): Bessette v.
W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 333 (1904); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 505,
510 (1873).
12. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74 (1957): McCrone v. United States,
307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939).
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a civil-contempt situation, the contemnor is imprisoned until he
agrees to comply with the order. His action or inaction is thus determinative of the length of any incarceration.13 Criminal contempt
proceedings, on the other hand, are instituted primarily for the purpose of vindicating the dignity and authority of the court.14 It consists of conduct disrespectful to the court or its processes, conduct
that obstructs the administration of justice. Because a finding of
criminal contempt is punitive in nature-operating as punishment
for a completed act of disrespect or disobedience-sentences for this
type of contempt are limited to fixed periods. In many instances it
is difficult to distinguish civil and criminal contempt. Under the federal statute,1 15 a single act may constitute either civil or criminal16
contempt or both.17 The distinction is important because the type of
contempt determines what procedural safeguards, if any, will apply
during the contempt proceedings. For example, while criminal contempt may necessitate the impaneling of a jury,18 civil contempt will
not. 19 Generally, the type of conduct, the purpose of the contempt
proceeding, and the nature of the punishment sought determine
whether the contempt is civil or criminal.20
Contempts have been further categorized as "direct" or "indirect." Direct contempt involves contemptuous conduct that is committed in the presence of the court or "so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice."21 Indirect contempt arises from conduct that, although not occurring in or near the presence of the
court, tends to obstruct the administration of justice.22 These distinctions-civil-criminal and direct-indirect-have been codified in
the rules and statutes that govern the exercise of the contempt power
by the federal courts.23
13. Although compliance by the contemnor will ensure his release, other events may
also secure it. For example, if he has been civilly committed for failing to answer
questions before a grand jury, he must be released from confinement upon dismissal
of that grand jury. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 864, 872 (1966).
14. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448 (1911).
15. 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1964).
16. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451-52 (1911); Bessette
v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 329 (1904).
17. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 72, 74 (1957).
18. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Chelf v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 873
(1966).
19. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
20. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448 (1911).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1964). Although "direct" does not appear in the statute, the
Court does recognize the term. See Nye v. United States, 813 U.S. 83 (1941).
22, Physical distance is determinative when measuring the "nearness" of the act.
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941), in which a contemptuous act that occurred over one hundred miles from the court was held not to be direct contempt.
23. See notes 27-33 infra and accompanying text.
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Statutory Codifications

The contempt power inherent under the common law received
statutory recognition early in the nation's history. The original codification did little more than note the existence of the power: "[A]11
the said courts of the United States shall have the power to ... punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same...."24
Unfortunately, the sweeping language of this provision provided no
guidelines or boundaries for its use and it was not until after the attempted impeachment of District Judge James Peck25 that the contempt power was somewhat delimited. 26 Current statutes place
specific limits on the exercise of the contempt power by the federal
courts. The bounds are basically set forth in the federal statute27 and
in Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.28 Rule 42 is
24. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
25. Judge Peck invoked the contempt power to disbar and imprison an attorney
who had published a criticism of one of Peck's decisions while it was pending appeal.
The judge's action brought outcries from Congress concerning misuse of the power
and resulted in impeachment proceedings against him. A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE
TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 445, 455 (1833). See also Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLOM. L. R.Ev. 401, 423-30 (1928).
26. The Peck case served as the catalyst for congressional action. In 1831, the House
of Representatives directed its Committee on the Judiciary "to inquire into the
expediency of defining by statute all offenses which may be punished as contempts of
the courts of the United States and also to limit the punishment for the same." 7
CONG. DEB. 560 (1831). After the inquiry Congress adopted remedial legislation. See
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 488.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964) provides:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
It should be noted that a lawyer "is not the kind of 'officer' who can be summarily
tried for contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(2)." Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399,
407-08 (1956). This fact has application to the contempts issued in the "Conspiracy
Seven" trial. Specifically, attorneys Kunstler and Weinglass would not be subject to
subsection (2) of the act; their alleged contempts would fall within the terms of subsection (1 ).
28. Rule 42. Criminal Contempt.
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt
shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as
provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice
shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the
criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given
orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for
that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is
entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He
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substantially a restatement of prior law as propounded in decisions
of the Supreme Court.29
Under Rule 42(a), the federal courts are allowed to punish "summarily"30 direct criminal contempts committed in the actual presence
of the court.31 In a case of summary punishment, the defendant's
procedural rights are significantly curtailed: he is not afforded notice,
the chance to defend himself, the assistance of counsel, the opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses, or the right to a jury
trial. 32 Rule 42(b), which requires notice and a hearing, provides
procedural regularity for all criminal contempts other than those
occurring in the situations envisioned by Rule 42(a). Under 42(b),
the contemnor is afforded the panoply of procedural safeguards operative in criminal proceedings and thus has, for example, the right
to prepare a defense, to have the assistance of counsel, to call witnesses, and, in appropriate cases, to have a jury trial.88

III.

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

A.

The Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury:
A Lesson in Circuity

Notwithstanding the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury
for criminal offenses,84 until recently the Supreme Court had consistently upheld the power of the federal courts to punish direct
is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from
presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a
verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
29. NOTES OF ADVISORY CO~[M. ON RULES, FED. R. CluM. P. 42(a), in Appendix, 18
U.S.C. (1964), at 3766.
30. Summary proceedings differ procedurally from traditional criminal convictions.
The Supreme Court has stated that " 'summary' • • • refers to a procedure which
dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from •.• all that
goes with a conventional court trial." Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).
Indeed, all the judge need do is inform the contemnors of the charges against them
and specify the sentences for each charge. The contemnors have no right to participate
in the proceedings. 343 U.S. at 9.
31. FED. R. CRIM, P. 42(a). For a discussion of limitations on the power of a court
to invoke summary proceedings, see notes 90-135 infra and accompanying text.
32. The procedural anomalies in summary proceedings result from reliance on
the theory that the court sees the contemptuous conduct in all its nuances and can
act on its own knowledge of the facts. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536
(1925). This theory assumes that the court will be able to evaluate and act upon the
facts in an objective manner, an assumption that is open to serious question.
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b), set out in note 28 supra.
34. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2 provides that "[t]he trial of all crimes, except in cases
of impeachment, shall be by jury ••••" U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides in part that
"the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.

"
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criminal contempt summarily. 35 Wary of impairing the ability of
judges to preserve order and decorum during the course of a trial,
the Court was hesitant to impose potentially cumbersome procedural
safeguards on contempt proceedings. Instead, judges were urged to
exercise the utmost self-restraint in utilizing their summary contempt
powers36 and were additionally instructed to consider "the extent of
the willful and deliberate defiance of the court's order [and] the
seriousness of the consequences of the contumacious behavior" before
imposing sentence.37 Although these nonconstitutional restraints still
exist, the despotic potential of the contempt power has led the Court
to impose additional restrictions of a constitutional nature.88 Thus,
in Che-ff v. Schnackenberg,39 the Court held that criminal contempt
convictions in the federal courts involving a sentence of six months
or less do not require a jury trial because they are "petty" offenses40
excluded from the protection of the sixth amendment. 41 In an emphatic dictum, the Court went on to direct that all future sentences
for criminal contempt exceeding six months require trial by jury.42
35. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692-700 (1964) (defendants
not entitled to a jury trial for serious contempts); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,
183 (1958) (no constitutional right to jury trial for criminal contempt).
36. See, e.g., In Te McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 233 (1962); Green v. United States, !156
U.S. 162, 188 (1958).
37. United States v. UMW, !130 U.S. 258, !103 (1947). See also In Te Bradley, lHS
U.S. 50, 52 (1943) (fine and imprisonment mutually exclusive alternatives).
38. The Court bad already imposed upon contempt proceedings some basic
procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954) (right to
an unbiased judge); In Te Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-72 (1948) (right to a public trial);
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (protection against self-incrimination).
39. 384 U.S. 373 (1966). Petitioner was charged with criminal contempt for aiding
and abetting a company to violate a pendente lite compliance order, issued by a court
at the instance of the Federal Trade Commission.
40. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937), in which the
Court noted that
[i]t is settled by the decisions of this Court ••• that the right of trial by jury •• ,
does not extend to every criminal proceeding. At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution there were numerous offenses, commonly described as "petty,"
which were tried summarily without a jury • • • •
41. 384 U.S. at !179-80.
42. 384 U.S. at 380. The Court's dictum presents a serious problem when applied to
criminal contempt because the federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 401, set out in note 27 supra)
does not establish a maximum penalty for contempt. Although the maximum penalty
authorized by statute would normally be determinative of the classification of an
offense as either petty or serious (see notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text), the
actual penalty imposed must be used if contempt is the crime under consideration.
Since the sentence to be imposed is unknown until after the summary contempt pro•
ceeding has been completed, it would appear that a two-step process may be necessary
if the "six-month" rule is to be applied to criminal contempt. Initially, the trial
judge would have to decide what sentence would be appropriate and, if the possible
sentence exceeded six months, a jury would have to be empaneled to bear the case on
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Subsequently, in Bloom v. Illinois, 43 the Court explicitly held that
the sixth amendment requires a jury trial in both federal and state
situations involving "serious" criminal contempt.44 Both potential
and real abuses of the contempt power served as justification for the
new rule.45 Indeed, the Court noted that the potential for judicial
abuse was greater in the area of contempt than in any other type of
criminal proceeding because contempt often strikes at the human
qualities of the judge and usually signals a rejection of his judicial
authority. 46 Presumably it was this potentially prejudicial aspect of
the offense that led the Court to erect the jury as a buffer between the
contemnor and the court, at least in all cases of "serious" criminal
contempt.47 Recently, in Baldwin v. New York, 48 the Court reaffirmed the use of the jury as a buffer in serious criminal cases:
[T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the possibility of oppression by the Government; the jury interposes between the accused
and his accuser the judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps
than a judge ... , but who at the same time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm of the Government that has proceeded against him.49
Although Baldwin did not deal specifically with contempt, its concern with the possibility of oppression may be of even greater significance in the area of criminal contempt in which the judge himself
acts as prosecutor.
the merits. There is, of course an incongruity in this process since the trial judge
would have to consider the merits at the outset in order to decide what would be an
appropriate sentence. In the wake of Chefj the alert judge would simply limit his contempt sentences to six months and perhaps string together several sentences of six
months in an attempt to avoid the jury trial requirement.
43. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Defendant was charged with contempt for willfully petitioning to admit to probate a falsely prepared will. His demand for a jury trial on
the contempt charge was refused and he was sentenced to two years imprisonment by
an Illinois state court. 391 U.S. at 210.
44. [S]erious contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject to the jury trial provision of the Constitution, now binding on the States,
and that the traditional rule is constitutionally infirm insofar as it permits
other than petty contempts to be tried wihout honoring a demand for a jury
trial.
391 U.S. at 198.
45. See 391 U.S. at 202-08.
46. 391 U.S. at 202 n.2.
47. In recognizing this need for an intervening jury, the Court specifically rejected
its prior holding in the case of In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895), that "[t]o submit
the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would
operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.'' 391 U.S. at 208.
48. 399 U.S. 66 (1970). The defendant had been charged with the misdemeanor of
"jostling," which carried a maximum sentence of one year. The denial of his motion
for a jury trial was reversed by the Court as a violation of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. 399 U.S. at 69, 73-74.
49. 899 U.S. at 72.
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The first question to be answered in light of Chef! and Bloom is
whether those decisions apply to the Dellinger situation since, on
their facts, they relate only to indirect criminal contempt.1'° I£ these
decisions are applicable only to indirect contempt, there is little
reason for concern with the jury trial issue since even "serious" direct contempt could be tried without a jury. An argument that
Chef! and Bloom should not be applied to cases of direct contempt
can be made. Direct contempt summarily adjudged has normally
produced sentences consisting of only a fine or a few days imprisonment51 whereas the imposition of increasingly severe punishments,
which prompted the Supreme Court's restrictive decisions in Chef]
and Bloom, has been primarily confined to cases of indirect contempt. 52 The Court's apparent concern, therefore, was with abuses
in the punishment of misbehavior that occurs beyond the purview
of the judge and not with the handling of direct contempt that occurs in the judge's presence. Thus, proponents of a· strong contempt
power might well argue that the restrictions of Chef! and Bloom apply only to those cases involving indirect contempt. However, in
Bloom, the Court precluded any such narrow interpretation; after
announcing the application of the sixth amendment to cases of serious contempt, it went on to consider specifically the jury trial right
in regard to the exercise of the summary (i.e., direct) contempt power.
Although noting the unique circumstances surrounding direct contempt and the attendant need for immediate action, the Court nevertheless found no reason to except serious direct-contempt proceedings
from the right to a jury trial. 53 Hence, if the Dellinger offenses con50. The facts in Cheff and Bloom are discussed in notes 39 & 43 supra. The directindirect contempt distinction is discussed in text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
51. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1965) (10 days imprisonment
and $250 fine); United States v. Bradt, 294 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1961) ($100 fine); Cammer
v. United States, 223 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1955), revd., 350 U.S. 399 (1956) ($100 fine);
Offutt v. United States, 208 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1953), revd., 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (10 days
imprisonment). See generally Comment, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Suggestion That Due Process Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent
Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463 (1966).
52. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 167 (1958) (three years imprison•
ment for failure to return from bail after a court had ordered return); Nilva v. United
States, 352 U.S. 385, 386 (1957) (one year and one day imprisonment for disobeying a
subpoena duces tecum); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 269 (1947) (union fined
$3,500,000 and its president fined $10,000 for disobeying a restraining order). See also
Comment, Constitutional Law-Right to Jury Trial in Indirect Criminal Contempts
in Federal Courts, 57 MICH. L. REv. 258, 264-66 (1958).
53. Although Rule 42(a) is based in part on the premise that it is not necessary
specially to present the facts of a contempt which occurred in the very presence
of the judge, it also rests on the need to maintain order and a deliberative atmosphere in the courtroom. The power of a judge to quell disturbance cannot
attend [sic] upon the impaneling of a jury. There is, therefore, a strong temptation to make exception to the rule we establish today for disorders in the courtroom. We are convinced, however, that no such special rule is needed.
391 U.S. at 209-10.
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stitute serious direct contempts, the six-month rule is clearly applicable.114
Although the Court has established the six-month line as the major characteristic of a "serious" offense and has employed that concept in making clear the applicability of the jury trial right to cases
of both direct and indirect contempt, it has not considered the question whether by charging a contemnor with a multiplicity of separate offenses and attaching a separate sentence of less than six
months to each, a court may impose a total sentence exceeding six
months without affording the protection of a jury trial. It was
through the use of such a technique that the district court in Dellinger was able to mete out aggregate sentences that exceeded, on
the average, twenty months in duration, 55 without expressly defying
the underlying principles of Chef!, Bloom, and Baldwin. Consequently, the major issue presented by Dellinger is whether the applicability of the constitutional requirement of a jury trial for
sentences exceeding six months is to be determined on the basis of
the individual sentence for each of the various incidents of contempt
or on the basis of the aggregate penalty for all the incidents of contempt. I£ the former is found to be the case, it would seem that the
heart of the substantive six-month rule may be circumvented in any
situation involving more than one alleged contempt by the same individual.
Even during the era of nonconstitutional constraints on the contempt power, the Supreme Court, in an effort to prevent judicial
arbitrariness, required that each contemptuous act occurring during
any proceeding be specified on the record thereof with the corresponding portion of the total punishment specifically set forth. 56
54. [W]hen serious punishment for contempt is contemplated, rejecting a demand for jury trial cannot be squared with the Constitution or justified by considerations of efficiency or the desirability of vindicating the authority of the
court.
391 U.S. at 208.
55. The contempt sentences imposed were:
Defendant
Charges
Sentence
Dellinger
32 specifications
2 years, 5 months, 16 days
Davis
23 specifications
2 years, 1 month, 14 days
Hayden
11 specifications
1 year, 2 months, 14 days
Hoffman
24 specifications
8 months
Rubin
16 specifications
2 years, 1 month, 23 days
Weiner
7 specifications
2 months, 18 days
Froines
IO specifications
5 months, 15 days
Weinglass (Attorney)
14 specifications
I year, 8 months, 28 days
Kunstler (Attorney)
24 specifications
4 years,
13 days
THE TALES OF HOFFMAN 287-89 (M. Levine, G. McNamee &: D. Greenberg ed. 1970)
[hereinafter 'I ALES].
56. Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 440 (1911). It should be
noted that Gompers required specification of indirect criminal contempt. Dellinger,
on the other hand, involves direct contempt. However, the specificity requirement
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More important, the Court has held that in certain situations repetitive actions, such as persistent refusals by a witness to answer the
same or similar questions, are to be adjudged a continuing contempt
and that, consequently, only one offense may be charged.57 Since this
"continuing contempt" limitation purports to restrict the compounding of sentences for the same type of continual misbehavior, it can
be argued that the incidents cited in the Dellinger contempt specifications should be considered as single continuing contempts by each
defendant. For several reasons the continuing contempt concept
seems applicable to the Dellinger case. First, the contemptuous conduct set out in the Dellinger specifications was chosen from a record
replete with continuous misbehavior: the defendants' antics represent a formidable portion of the 22,000 page trial transcript. 58 Second,
the trial judge conceded that the defendants were being punished
for their participation in a single plan to disrupt the trial rather
than for the isolated incidents specified. Thus, at one point, Judge
Hoffman said "[I]t has been my considered judgment throughout
this case that the behavior of the defendants was aimed at baiting
the judge and inciting and harassing the U.S. Attorneys in an attempt
to stop the trial."li9
The vagueness of the authorizing statute relied on by the court in
Dellinger lends further support to the use of the continuing contempt
or single-offense theory. In its pertinent part the statute provides only
that a court may punish "[m]isbehavior of any person in its presence
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."60 In
passing this statute, Congress failed to fix the offense in an unambiguous fashion. The Court has said of construing such statutes that
"doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into
multiple offenses... .'' 61 The application of this continuing offense
would appear to be equally applicable to direct criminal contempt since the Court in
Gompers was concerned only with the distinction between civil and criminal contempts
and applied the specification procedure to the latter contempts as a class. 221 U.S. at
441.
57. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1957). See also United States v. Orman,
207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
58. Judge Hoffman himself said, before sentencing defendants for their alleged
contempts, "some of the offenders have engaged in such impudent repetition of their
misconduct, that the court finds the imposition of consecutive sentences necessary."
CONTEMPT, TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND REsPONSES OF THE
CHICAGO CONSPIRACY 10, 42 (1970) [hereinafter CONTEMPT].
59. Id. at 43-44.
60. 18 u.s.c. § 401(1) (1964).
61. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955). Bell involved a prosecution under
the Mann Act wherein the defendant was charged with a &eparate violation for each
of two women he transport!!d across state lines. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that there was but a single violation. 349 U.S. at 84. The "single transaction" test of
Bell is not the only test established by the Court. In Blockburger v. United States, 284
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concept would allow the imposition of only one sentence per contemnor, which, in turn, would be subject to the six-month limitation
on the use of summary punishment.
In deciding whether the actions in Dellinger constitute separate
offenses or a single contempt, reference must again be made to the
language of the authorizing statute.62 It should be noted that the
other contempt provisions embodied in the federal code contain fixed
maximum penalties; 63 the statute in question, however, leaves the
choice of penalty completely to the discretion of the trial court. This
lack of any statutory maximum for judicially imposed contempt
sentences may indicate an intention on the part of Congress to allow
a substantial degree of judicial discretion with respect to contempt
by authorizing trial court judges to select not only the sentence of
their choice but the basis for prosecution as well-that is, by giving
them the power to determine exactly what actions will constitute
separate offenses. The history of section 401 belies this argument,
however. The federal contempt statutes were not enacted to provide
the courts with a new tool for dealing with courtroom disturbances. 64
The contempt power existed long before 1789 when the first contempt legislation was passed by Congress.65 Instead the statutory refinements have purported to restrict and define the courts' contempt
power, not to enhance it.66 Any interpretation granting such unrestricted power to a judge contravenes the spirit of the legislation. In
view of the restrictive intent of the original contempt statute, it does
U.S. 29!1, !104 (19!!2), the Court announced: "[I']he test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each [charge] requires proof
of fact [sic] which the other does not." Since each contempt specification is a separate
incident susceptible to proof by different facts, it could be argued that the "same
evidence" test under Blockburger is met. However, in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436
(1970) (the fifth amendment's protection against double jeopardy embodies the collateral estoppcl principle), Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall expressly rejected
use of the "same evidence" rule in their concurring opinion. Instead, they offered a
"same transaction" test as a substitute. !!97 U.S. 448, 451-52. Argument by analogy here
would be tenuous since Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall were not speaking
for a majority of the Court. Indeed, it could be argued that the test is inappropriate
for a unique offense such as contempt. While Bloom has seemingly disposed of this
proposition by proclaiming contempt to be a crime like any other crime, the distintion receives some support from the lack of any time-space relation in the setting of
continuing misbehavior. "While a man can murder six men at virtually the same time,
the contumacious acts may be spread over a period of several months as in Dellinger.
On this basis the analogy might prove unsound.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 401, set out in note 27 supra.
63. Contempts committed in military courts are statutorily restricted. Article 28
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 848 (1964) prescribes a punishment
not to exceed confinement for 30 days or a fine of $100, or both. 22 U.S.C. § 703(c)
(1964), concerning service courts of friendly foreign forces, limits punishment to a fine
of $2,000 or 6 months imprisonment, or both.
64. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 24 supra.
66. See generally Recent Decision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REY. 114 (1962).
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not seem amiss in doubtful cases to construe its provisions in favor
of .finding a single continuing offense rather than a string of multiple
offenses. Such a reading of the statute would, of course, allow the
imposition of only one sentence, which then would be subject to the
six-month limitation on summary proceeding-s.
Should the attempt to characterize the contempts in Dellinger as
single continuing offenses prove unavailing, there remains the serious
concern that, by simply dividing the offense into numerous components, potentially in.finite sentences could be meted out summarily
by a trial judge under Rule 42(a) without the defendant receiving the
protection of any procedural safeguards. 67 Thus, one of the basic
issues posed by Dellinger is whether any of the contemnors are entitled to a jury trial under Chef! and Bloom. If the total punishment
that Judge Hoffman could have summarily imposed must fall
within the six-month limitation for serious criminal contempt, all
but two of the contemnors should be accorded a jury trial. 68 The crux
of the problem is that no statute or court decision expressly denies a
trial court the power to aggregate sentences that individually do not
exceed the six-month line drawn by Bloom and Chef!. The deficiency
inherent in any such proposition, however, lies in its practical application, for it is only when the aggregate sentence is considered determinative that any realistic limits are imposed by Bloom and Chef!.
If trial judges are left free to dispense six-month sentences for each
count of contempt, any judge could, simply by searching the record
for any colorable instances of contempt and imposing the maximum
sentence for each one, send a contemnor to jail for an almost in.finite
period of time. Thus, if the six-month rule is applicable only to each
offense, it does not curtail potential abuse of the contempt power. It
was, after all, the Supreme Court's recognition of the potential abuse
inherent in the contempt power that led it in Bloom to impose the
six-month maximum for nonjury proceeding-s. If harshness and abuse
in the form of lengthy contempt sanctions are tolerated under the
guise that they represent punishment for separate offenses, the entire
purpose of the constitutional limitations imposed by Bloom, Chef!,
and Baldwin is frustrated. 69 If the Court is genuinely concerned about
67. There are at least three potential restraints on the use of summary contempt
under Rule 42(a). First, while punishment generally lies within the sound discretion
of the court, it may be disturbed if clearly abused. Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385,
396 (1957). Second, the punishment cannot be cruel and unusual. Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 187-88 (1958); United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d
136, 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 734 (1944). A final potential limitation is the
rule that a penal sanction exceeding six months in duration may not be imposed absent
a jury trial. See notes 39-54 supra and accompanying text.
68. Only defendants Froines (5 months, 15 days) and Weiner (2 months, 18 days)
were given less than six-month sentences. See note 55 supra.
69. A decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Langes,
434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mayberry v. Penn•
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potential abuse of the contempt power, it would appear self-defeating
to affirm Judge Hoffman's actions in Dellinger.
In determining whether the six-month limit applies to aggregate
sentencing, analogy to other areas of constitutional law and criminal
procedure might prove fruitful. In regard to the constitutional right
to counsel, for example, the aggregate punishments authorized by statute determine whether the guarantee is applicable.70 The aggregate
sentence is also often determinative when a defendant seeks a court
appeal.71 Since these procedural rights are based upon the aggregate
punishment levied, it seems logical to extend the constitutional right
to a jury trial in contempt proceedings on the similar basis of the
aggregate sentence imposed. Even given this view, however, it could
be argued that since Judge Hoffman could have summarily punished
the contemnors immediately after each outbreak, he should be
allowed to cumulate the individual offenses for dispensation upon
termination of the trial. Indeed, the summary contempt power under
Rule 42(a) has sometimes been invoked after completion of the trial,
the justification being that the trial judge should not be precluded
from utilizing a power he possessed during the trial just because he
awaited the conclusion of the trial to invoke it.72 The Supreme Court,
in Sacher v. United States,73 concluded that no possible prejudice
could result in that case from the delayed use of summary contempt,
since the conduct of the contemnor had warranted immediate punishment on "dozens of occasions." 74 This reasoning, however, has come
under attack by critics and has been disregarded in more recent Court
decisions. 75
It would appear that theories are available that would both allow
or deny the imposition of multiple contempt sentences in excess of
six months by a judge acting without a jury. Because of the argumentative circuity involved, attempts to resolve the problem of the
application of Bloom and Chef! to multiple consecutive contempt
sylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), serves to illustrate the potential ramifications of cumulating prison sentences in summary contempt proceedings. Mayberry, a convict, was
summarily sentenced for contempt under Pennsylvania law for a term of eleven to
twenty-two years imprisonment on eleven separate one- to two-year sentences. For
further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 132-35 infra.
70. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1969) ("If a guilty person is convicted, the sum of the potential [actual] penalties is what is important to him-and
to society.'). See also Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963
(1969); Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969); Steadman v. Duff, 302 F. Supp. 313
(1969).
71. See Chambers v. District of Columbia, 194 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1952); O'Bryant
v. District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 799 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1966).
72. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
73. 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
74. 343 U.S. at 10.
75. See notes 108-13 infra and accompanying text.

1562

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69:1549

sentences solely in terms of the length of imprisonment may prove
fruitless. Because the length of the prison term is so intertwined with
the issue of defendants' rights to a jury trial, it might be better to
approach the problem by seeking alternative means of measuring the
seriousness of the contempt. Given that the contempt must be
"serious" if defendants are to qualify for a jury trial, the problem
could be viewed as one of measuring the gravity of their offenses in
terms of the traditional factors normally relied upon for determining
the seriousness of other crimes.76 The "nature of the offense" and its
"stigma" represent types of alternative factors that might be taken
into consideration.77 Illustratively, the mere existence of multiple, as
opposed to single, contempt may be considered as an indication of a
more serious offense. Further, the stigma which attaches to conviction
and four years imprisonment, and which may cause irreparable
damage to a defendant's reputation, is surely indicative of a "serious"
offense. On the other hand, the character of contempt is such that it is
rarely considered a "hard-core" crime like murder or rape.
There is some evidence that the Supreme Court might be receptive to analyzing the seriousness of the contempts in terms of factors
other than the length of the sentence. At least in the case of ordinary
offenses, the Court has said that punishment is but one indication of
the seriousness of a crime.78 Since contempts are indistinguishable
from ordinary crimes,79 it would appear reasonable to apply this
"alternative-factor" analysis. However, the Court has been reluctant
to move in this direction. In Frank v. United States,80 defendant was
charged with indirect criminal contempt for violation of an order of
the Securities and Exchange Commission. After being denied a jury
trial, he was convicted and sentenced to three years' probation. The
case appeared ripe for the use of the alternative-factor analysis by the
Supreme Court since the statutory definition of a "petty offense"
speaks exclusively in terms of penal sanctions and monetary fines 81
76. Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the majority's opinion in Chelf. They
felt that any determination of seriousness required a sophisticated analysis of the
nature of the offense, not just the punishment. Factors to be considered, they felt,
should include (but would not be limited to) the stigma, character (malum in se or
malum prohibitum), and gravity of the offense. Furthermore, they argued, the right to
trial by jury should be expanded to encompass all crimes, petty and serious. 384 U.S. at
387-90.
77. Frankfurter &: Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty
of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REY. 917, 980-81 (1926),
78. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) ("crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty
offenses"). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (reckless driving
offenses held to require a jury trial because they were malum in se).
79. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
80. 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
81. "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for :,
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without any mention of how to deal with a probationary penalty. The
Court refused, however, to consider any factors other than the actual
length of the penalty imposed82 and, since probation for up to five
years is appropriate for both petty and serious offenses,88 the threeyear probationary period fell, at least definitionally, within the confines of the petty offense statute. While this decision may be limited
to probation cases, if read broadly it would imply that the Court is
unwilling to look beyond the length of sentence imposed in determining the seriousness of the contempt. Frank may thus signal a judicial
intention to adhere strictly to the letter of Bloom and Gheff. The
duration of the sentence may be the only factor that the Court is
willing to consider, and while it may be appealing to argue alternative factors, the Court may be less than willing to listen.
The question whether the contemnors should be afforded a jury
trial is thus a circuitous one. I£ the sentence exceeds six months in
duration, a jury trial is required. Yet it is unclear whether the sixmonth limit applies to each separate sentence or to the aggregate
term of imprisonment. Support can be found for either proposition.
Finally, it appears doubtful that the courts will look beyond the
length of sentence to determine the "seriousness" of the crime. Faced
with the difficult problem of interpreting "seriousness," the courts
may well look to one of the other issues raised by Dellinger in order
to prevent abuses of the contempt power.
B.

Summary Proceedings vs. Notice and Hearing

Citation for direct contempt should not be delayed for months.
It should spring fresh from the alleged obstruction of the court's performance of its judicial duty, although adjudication and punishment
might well await the convenience of the court's business.84
Rule 42 provides two methods for dealing with contempt: summary disposition and disposition upon notice and hearing.85 Of the
various categories of contempt, only certain direct contempts are
subject to summary disposition under Rule 42(a).86 Beyond this
narrowly defined class of misbehavior, contempt may be adjudged
only after notice and hearing under Rule 42(b). In discussing the two
types of contempt, the Court has said: "Rule 42(b) prescribes the
'procedural regularity' for all contempts in the federal regime except
period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense."
18 u.s.c. § 1(3) (1964).
82. 395 U.S. at 149. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691-92 (1964), which specifically
provide for jury trials.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964).
84. Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir, 1961).
85. FED, R. CRIM. P. 42, set out in note 28 supra.
86. See R. GoLDFARB, THE CoNTEMPT Powm 48 (1963).
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those unusual situations envisioned by Rule 42(a) where instant
action is necessary to protect the judicial institution itself." 87
The justification for summary action in cases of direct contempt is
twofold. First, because the misbehavior occurs before the judge, he is
able to observe the contempt in all its nuances. Thus, if the trial court
can remain objective, no further facts need be introduced to prove or
disprove the defendant's guilt. Second, the power to summarily
punish contempt is often justified as necessary to the preservation of
order in the courtroom or of "the judicial institution itself." Consistent with the logic of this second justification, summary punishment of contempt is authorized only when the exigencies of the trial
require immediate action. 88 This restriction is an outgrowth of the
general belief that judicial action should be limited to the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 89
Notwithstanding such justifications, the summary contempt
power has evoked criticism from legal scholars,90 many of whom feel
that the need for procedural safeguards outweighs the justifications
offered in support of the power. Concern has focused on the seemingly anomalous position held by the summary contempt power in a
judicial system predicated on due process of law. Undoubtedly because of these concerns, the Supreme Court has attempted to restrict
the situations in which the power may be invoked. Thus, in a case
decided over two decades ago, the Court recognized that a judge sitting as a one-man grand jury was not qualified to sit in judgment on
the contempt charges he had levied against witnesses appearing
before him. 91 However, this relaxation of what previously had
amounted to a strict and zealous protection of judicial authority was
partially nullified by dictum to the effect that any "demoralization" of
judicial authority would not be tolerated and summary action would
87. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965). See also United States v. Pace,
371 F.2d 810, 811 (2d Cir. 1967).
88. "[Summary] punishment was so contrary to ••• due process, that the assumption that the court saw everything that went on in open court was required to justify
the exception [for summary contempt]; but the need for immediate penal vindication
of the dignity of the court created it." Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925).
See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919); Ex
parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
89. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821).
90. Frankfurter &: Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A. Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 1010, 1024-26 (1924); Note, Supreme Court Narrows Scope of Summary Procedures
in Federal Contempt Convictions, 1966 DuKE L.J. 814; Recent Cases, 36 MINN.
L. R.Ev. 965 (1952); Recent Cases, 99 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 540 (1951).
91. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). While the Court specifically alluded to the
need for a public trial when one man fulfills the roles of prosecutor, plaintiff, judge,
and jury, there was equal concern for the defendant's right to defend himself against
the charge, especially since there was no apparent need for instantaneous punishment.
333 U.S. at 273.
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be sanctioned in such circumstances.92 In yet another case, the Court
noted that contempts could be disposed of only after notice and a
hearing
[u]nless [the action presents] such an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and
presence of the judge before the public in the "very hallowed place
of justice", ... [that if it] is not instantly suppressed and punished,
demoralization of the court's authority will follow. 93

At the outset then, the Supreme Court's concern with the degree
of disrespect shown the lower courts lends some support to Judge
Hoffman's choice of summary contempt in Dellinger since the defendants' purported goal was to defy and ridicule the entire system
of justice.04 However, since it appears that "immediacy" is at least
generally required before summary disposition can be had under
Rule 42(a), the contempt sentences in Dellinger appear to be questionable in light of the fact that the summary proceedings took place
after the trial was over. Yet, in Sacher v. United States,95 the Court
ignored the "immediacy" requirement for summary contempt and
specifically sanctioned the use of summary procedure in a trial in
which direct contempts were involved. After the jury had returned a
verdict in Sacher, the contemnors96 were summarily punished for
their courtroom behavior. In interpreting Rule 42 for the first time
and citing two lower-court decisions in which contempt proceedings
had been deferred until after trial, 97 the Court affirmed the contempt
charges. However, the Court's reliance on these two lower court
decisions may have been unfortunate since the cases involved only
short overnight delays08 between the actual misbehavior and the
contempt proceedings, whereas the Sacher tontempt proceedings had
been delayed for nine months, a period covering the entire trial. Although this time distinction was obvious, the Court concluded that
92. 333 U.S. at 257, quoting from Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925).
93. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925).
9-!. See TIME, Feb. 23, 1970, at 38-39; NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1970, at 26, cols. 1-2.
95. 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
96. The contemnors were defense attorneys involved in a criminal trial. The contempts stemmed from their actions in the district court in the case of United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), afjd., 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
97. The Court cited Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951), in which the court affirmed a lower court's summary contempt proceeding which had been delayed overnight before judgment was pronounced; and Maclnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 953 (1952), in which the court affirmed a summary contempt proceeding involving an overnight delay before the contemnor was notified that a certificate of
contempt would be filed. 343 U.S. at 7.
98. See note 97 supra. See also United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 851 (1949), in which the contempt citation occurred the same day as
the disruptions, but formal judgment was deferred for five days.
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"summary" does not refer to the timing of the contempt action but
merely does away with the "formalities" of notice and hearing. 99
Specifically, the delay was deemed to fall within the trial court's
discretion as long as the defendants were not prejudiced by it, and,
since any contempt proceedings during the trial might have prejudiced the defendants either in the eyes of the jury or by loss of
counsel, the Supreme Court found no abuse of ·discretion in the
lower court's decision to await the trial's conclusion before taking
affirmative action.100 However, in Dellinger the prejudice problem is
less compelling because many of the specified contempts took place
while the jury was out of the courtroom. 101 Had the defendants been
cited for contempt during the jury's absence there could have been
no prejudice, since the jury was sequestered during the entire trial.
Moreover, when the contemptuous acts did take place in the jury's
presence, prejudice might have been avoided by sending the jury
from the courtroom and immediately citing the defendants while deferring adjudication and punishment until after the trial.
In Sacher, the Court also voiced concern over the delay that
might be caused by interjecting a contempt proceeding into the
middle of a trial. Such potential delay, it was argued, could be best
avoided by awaiting the trial's conclusion and then proceeding
against the contemnors summarily.102 There are at least two objections to the Court's reasoning. First, delay could be avoided by
proceeding in the two-step fashion discussed above, that is, by
immediate citation with adjudication and punishment deferred until
after the conclusion of the trial. Second, if delay is only a problem
during and not after the trial, there is no reason for not holding a full
hearing on the contempt question after the trial. Indeed, if summary
action is the exception rather than the rule and is justified only when
delay must be avoided, it has no purpose when the need for immediate action has passed. If the summary power is justified by its
service to the judge in his attempts to quell disturbances that obstruct
or delay the trial, that justification ceases to suffice when the trial has
ended.
The proposition that only an acute need for an immediate sanction allows the use of the summary powers found in Rule 42(a) is
supported by Justice Holmes' statement:
I would go as far as any man in favor of the sharpest and most summary enforcement of order in Court and obedience to decrees, but
99. 343 U.S. at 9.
100. 343 U.S. at 8-10.
101. For example, many of the contempt charges against attorney Weinglass were
the result of lengthy legal argument. These arguments often occurred after the jury
had been excused. See CONTEMPT, supra note 58, at 213-34.
102. 343 U.S. at 10.
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when there is no need for immediate action contempts are like any
other breach of law and should be dealt with as the law deals with
other illegal acts.103
Justice Black, in his dissent in Sacher, echoed this thought: "There
was no necessity here for ... summary action, because the trial was
over and the danger of obstructing it was passed."104 Seemingly then
neither Holmes nor Black would condone the proceedings in Dellinger since the contempt sentences were dispensed in summary
fashion after the trial had ended. However, Judge Hofftnan may well
have believed that the interjection of 16!1°5 citations for contempt
during the trial would have resulted in constant disruption, thereby
defeating the very end that the summary contempt power was
created to further. It might additionally be posited that if the judge's
actions were restricted in such fashion that it was impossible for him
to exercise his authorized power during the trial, he at least should
be able to use the power after the trial. Indeed, if the reason for delay
in dealing with the alleged contempts was solely to prevent any prejudice from tainting the defendants' trial, why should they thus be
allowed to escape summary punishment that could have been administered but for solicitude for their right to a fair trial? As the
Court in Sacher stated:
H the conduct of these lawyers warranted immediate summary punishment on dozens of occasions, no possible prejudice to them can result from delaying it until the end of the trial if the circumstances
permit such delay. The overriding consideration is the integrity and
efficiency of the trial process....10 0

Perhaps the only reply necessary to the position taken in Sacher
is to remark that it appears somewhat anomalous that the Court
should, in effect, consider the power of summary contempt superior
to those procedural safeguards so vital to anyone charged with criminal misconduct. Further, the Court in Sacher failed to deal with the
aspect of the practical deterrent effect on future courtroom misbehavior that immediate citation for contempt might have provided. If one of the fundamental premises underlying punishment
of criminal behavior is the belief that a sanction will serve to deter
similar conduct in the future, the use of the summary contempt
power after a trial has ended forecloses any deterrent effect that a
103. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 425-26 (1918) (Holmes,
dissenting).
104. !143 U.S. at 21. See also Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965) (refusal to answer not "committed in presence of court"); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S.
517 (1925) (letter to judge no obstruction to trial). Cf. United States v. Combs, 390
F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967).
105. See note 55 supra.
106. !143 U.S at 10.

J .,
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finding of contempt during the trial might have by warning the
offenders that all future contemptuous actions would be met with
swift judicial action. The delayed use of the summary contempt
power in both Sacher and Dellinger, coming as it did after the conclusion of the trials, only served to reprimand the misconduct and
deter similar misbehavior before other courts. It did not deter further
misconduct during the parent proceedings.
Fortunately, Sacher remains an anomaly disregarded in later cases,
a decision that has evoked strong criticism from commentators.107
Subsequent decisions108 indicate a return to the traditional view requiring a need for immediate action that prevailed prior to Sacher
and was the basis for the dissents in that decision.109 Thus, the use of
summary contempt under Rule 42(a) came under attack in 1965 in
Harris v. United States. 110 In Harris, the defendant refused, both
before and after being assured immunity, to answer certain questions
before a grand jury. Finally, he was sworn before a district judge and
again questioned. When the defendant continued his refusal to
answer, the court issued a summary contempt citation and imposed a
one-year jail sentence as punishment.111 In reversing the contempt
sentence, the Supreme Court declared that summary punishment
should be used only when necessary to achieve a speedy recovery of
the court's dignity.112 The need for immediate action was thus restored as the prerequisite to summary action:
[S]peedy punishment may be necessary in order to achieve "summary
107. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 86, at 255-56; Comment, supra note 51; Note,
Effect of Delay in Summary Punishment for Criminal Contempt Under Rule 42(a),
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 795 (1952).
108. See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); United States v. Combs, 390
F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967).
109. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissented (343 U.S. at 14, 23, 89), their
concern being twofold. The first concern was that
[r]eason and fairness demand, even in punishing contempt, procedural safeguards
within which the needs for the effective administration of justice can be amply
satisfied while at the same time the reach of so drastic a power is kept witliin
limits that will minimize abuse.
343 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The dissenters also found fault with the majority's unyielding support of a trial
judge who "failed to exercise the moral authority of a court possessed of great tradition." 343 U.S. at 38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter assailed the
majority's logic by noting that protection of an abuse of power diminishes, not enhances, the authority and tradition of the courts. 343 U.S. at 25.
110. 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
111. 382 U.S. at 163.
112. 382 U.S. at 164. In so ruling the Court overruled Brown v. United States, 359
U.S. 41 (1959), which had permitted the use of summary procedures under almost
identical facts. Other cases in which courts invoked summary contempt when there was
no need for immediate action were probably overruled by Harris. See, e.g., Levine v.
United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960) (refusal to testify before grand jury); Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (refusal to answer query by grand jury); Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (refusal to respond to subpoenas duces tecum by
grand jury).
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vindication of the court's dignity and authority." ... But swiftness
was not a prerequisite of justice here....
• . . The contempt here committed was far outside the narrow
category envisioned by Rule 42(a) ....
·we are concerned solely with •~procedural regularity" . . . .
Rule 42(b) prescribes the "procedural regularity" for all contempts
in the federal regime except those unusual situations envisioned by
Rule 42(a) where instant action is necessary ....113
Consequently, Harris has apparently overruled sub silentio the earlier
Sacher decision by requiring that there be an open and serious threat
to the proceedings which only "instant action" is capable of dispelling. Therefore, this requirement defines the scope of 42(a); anything
requiring less than immediate judicial action must be disposed of in
accordance with 42(b).
If instantaneous action is the test to be applied to direct contempt
under Harris, Judge Hoffman's actions in Dellinger are unlikely to
be upheld for, by the time of the contempt sentences, the trial had
concluded and the need to restore order to the proceedings or to
ensure their orderly continuation had passed. 114 The fact that the
trial had concluded suggests that Judge Hoffman found himself able
to exert enough control during the trial, without utilizing his summary powers, to bring it to a close. If the trial judge felt no compelling need to resort to summary action during the trial, it is difficult,
in light of Harris, to imagine why it should be utilized after the trial
had ended. Moreover, while a Rule 42(b) hearing would have delayed
the grand jury proceedings in Harris, no delay would have ensued in
Dellinger since the actual trial had already been completed. Thus the
potential delay-which the Court deemed minimal in Harris115-was
not even present in Dellinger. Harris strongly suggests that a hearing
under Rule 42(b) was the proper procedure for the Dellinger court to
follow.

C. Embroilment of the Trial Judge
Distinguishing situations appropriate for the use of the summary
contempt power from those requiring nonsummary proceedings
under Rule 42 is further complicated by the assumption that due
process of law requires a judge who holds a personal interest in the
1111. 882 U.S. at 164-67 (footnotes omitted).
114. The situation in Dellinger may indeed resemble that described by Justice
Frankfurter in Sacher:
Despite the many incidents of contempt that were charged, the trial went to completion •• , without a single occasion making it necessary to lay any one of the
lawyers by the heel in order to assure that the trial proceed. The trial judge was
able to keep order and to continue the court's business. • • •
343 U.S. at 86 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
115. 882 U.S. at 164.
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outcome of a trial to disqualify himself from hearing the case.116 The
possibility of a judicial bias affecting the outcome of a contempt proceeding is most serious when one man acts as both judge and jury,
which, essentially, is the role of the judge when he summarily adjudges contempts under Rule 42(a). Cognizant of this danger, the
Supreme Court has intensively scrutinized contempt convictions summarily imposed under Rule 42(a) when the trial judge may have
been personally embroiled in the contemptuous events.117 Thus,
while the majority in Sacher disregarded the defendants' allegations
that the trial judge was personally involved in the parent proceeding,
the dissenters placed great weight on this contention.118 Citing from
the trial record, they noted that a judge who is embroiled in the proceedings should not be permitted to sit in judgment of the contempts.119 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter spoke directly to the majority's
concern with diminishing the esteem held for the courts when he
recognized that by permitting an embroiled judge to rule on the contempts, the Court was actually rendering a disservice to the judiciary
and tainting the very image they were seeking to uphold.120 The
majority, however, rejected this argument, reasoning that to require
a hearing before another judge would only serve to harass the trial
judge since he would have to defend his actions in a separate proceeding.121
The Court's subsequent holding in Offutt v. United States122
vitiated the embroilment aspect of the Sacher decision. In Offutt, the
trial court, relying on Sacher, waited until after the jury had retired
to deliberate before summarily sentencing the defense counsel to
ten days' imprisonment for his constant bantering and generally undignified exchanges with the judge during the course of the trial.123
Relying not on Sacher, but on the older precedent of Cooke v. United
States,124 the Supreme Court held that a judge who becomes em116. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
523 (1927).
117. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13-15 (1954).
118. 343 U.S. at 16-17 (Black, J., dissenting).
119. "A judge who • , • [becomes embroiled] should no more be permitted to try
the lawyer he accuses than a judge should be permitted to try his own case." 348 U.S.
at 17 (Black, J., dissenting).
120, 343 U.S. at 37 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121, 343 U.S. at 11-12.
122, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
123. 348 U.S. at 12. The Court commented that the exchanges between the attorney
and the judge revealed "an attitude which hardly reflected the restraints of conventional judicial demeanor." 348 U.S. at 12.
124. 267 U.S. 517 (1925). The Court in Cooke held that a contemptuous letter given
to the judge, although technically "misbehavior in the presence of the court," must
be adjudged in a hearing before another judge since the letter had vilified the trial
judge, thus personally involving him in the outcome of the contempt proceeding.
267 U.S. at 539.
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broiled in the contemptuous conduct has lost the impersonal authority necessary to sit in judgment of the contemnor.
The real issue is whether under the decision of the Cooke case such
a ruling should have been made by the trial judge, or whether for the
very purpose of vindicating justice for which the power of summary
contempt is available, the determination of petitioner's guilt and the
punishment properly to be meted out on a finding of guilt should
have been made in the first instance by a judge not involved, as was
this trial judge, in the petitioner's misconduct.125
The Court went on to state that if the trial judge is involved in the
contemnor's misbehavior another judge, perhaps the chief judge of
the district, should determine the contemnor's guilt and punishment, if any, after a hearing under Rule 42(b).126
After the Offutt decision, in order for a defendant to request and
receive a hearing by a separate judge under Rule 42(a), the trial judge
must have played an active role in the defendant's misbehavior or
become personally involved in the outcome of the case.127 The test
established by Offutt and Cooke was whether the contemnor's behavior could be considered apart from the trial judge's own actions.128
For example, in Offutt the trial judge had participated in the exchanges with the contemnor that served as the basis for the contempt citations; 129 thus, the trial judge's behavior could not be
considered apart from that of the contemnor. However, if the trial
judge chose to proceed only after notice and hearing under Rule
42(b), the rule itself provided for his disqualification should the contempt have "[involved] disrespect or criticism" of him.130 Thus,
under the approach established by the Offutt and Cooke interpretation, no parity existed between 42(a) and 42(b) situations since each
section provided a separate and distinct test for embroilment: under
42(a) the trial judge had to be involved in the contemnor's misbehavior, as in Offutt, before he could be disqualified, whereas a mere
criticism or disrespectful remark, even though it failed to elicit any
response from the bench, automatically disqualified the judge from
participating in a 42(b) proceeding. As a result of this disparity, it was
easier for a contemnor to be granted a new judge for a 42(b) hearing
125. 348 U.S. at 15.
126. 348 U.S. at 18. The chief judge appears to be the logical choice since he is
not exactly on the same level with the other. district judges and may not feel quite
as restricted in ruling on contempts that involve other judges' actions. See also Cooke
v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Combs, 390 F.2d 426, 429-30 (6th Cir, 1968).
128. 348 U.S. at 13; 267 U.S. at 539.
129, 348 U.S. at 16 n.2.
130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). Rule 42(a) has no such provision. See note 28 supra.
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than for a contempt proceeding under 42(a).131 However, in a recent
decision, the Supreme Court has made the requirements for "embroilment" the same under 42(a) and 42(b). The contemptuous
behavior in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania132 consisted of various verbal
assaults on the trial judge by the defendant, who was acting as his own
counsel. The judge, however, restrained himself and avoided becoming involved in the defendant's misbehavior. After the trial the defendant was summarily sentenced to a term of eleven to twenty-two
years imprisonment on eleven separate one- to two-year sentences.138
The Supreme Court noted that since the trial judge had refrained
from active participation in the defendant's contempt, the Offutt
test134 had not been met.
Offutt does not fit this case for the state judge in the instant controversy was not an activist seeking combat. Rather, he was the target
of petitioner's insolence. Yet a judge, vilified as was this Pennsylvania
judge, necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm
detachment necessary for fair adjudication.135
Thus, under Mayberry, vilification of the trial judge is all that is
necessary under Rule 42(a) to require a contempt hearing before a
different judge.
Unfortunately, many of the specific contempts in Dellinger do
not fall within the Mayberry rule of "vilification." While several of
the contempt specifications involved direct assaults on the judiciary,
and Judge Hoffman in particular, many were based on outbreaks
unrelated to the judge.136 However, at least with regard to those
131. Not every criticism of the judge is sufficient to support a new hearing by a
separate judge. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 578, 583-84 (1964) (a prosecution wit•
ness' criticism of the trial judge's rules did not necessarily mean that the judge was
embroiled). But cf. United States v. Combs, 390 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968), in which
contemnor was charged with contempt for (1) alleging bias by the judge and (2)
recording proceedings in the courtroom with neither the knowledge nor consent of
the trial judge. While the trial judge agreed to allow another judge to hear the first
charge, he retained jurisdiction over the second. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that both should be tried by a new judge since the trial judge's "feelings" were involved in the second charge and there was no need for immediate action. 390 F .2d
at 431.
132. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
133. 400 U.S. at 455.
134. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
135. 400 U.S. at 465.
136. Thus, at least thirty-one of the specifications involved the defendants' refusals
to rise when the judge entered the courtroom and other indignities paid the court.
Specifically,
[O]n February 6th, the defendant[s] Hoffman [and Rubin] attempted to hold the
Court up to ridicule by entering the courtroom in judicial robes ••••
While the transcript does not reflect it, [they] remained in those robes for a
considerable period of time before the jury. Later, [they] removed the robes, threw
them on the floor of the courtroom, and wiped [their] feet on them.
Specifications No. 13 (Rubin) and 24 (Hoffman). CoNTEMPT, supra note 58, at 127,
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specifications that were based on remarks exhibiting disrespect for
the authority of the trial judge, Judge Hoffman should have been
precluded from personally deciding the contempt question. I£ impartiality in the contempt proceeding is the goal, it is doubtful that
it could have been achieved under the circumstances of Dellinger.
Moreover, the trial court exhibited personal disdain for the defendants and their counsel. The court's attitude was best characterized by its address to attorney Kunstler before the latter was sentenced
for contempt:
I am going to make a rather unorthodox statement. First of all, there
is a lot of crime .... I am one of those who believe that crime, if
it is on the increase, ... is due in large part to the fact that waiting
in the wings are lawyers who are willing to go beyond ... professional
duty in their defense of a defendant, and the fact that ... some defendants know that such a lawyer is waiting in the wings, I think,
has a rather stimulating effect on the increase in crime.187
There remain some discernible factors that could lead to an appellate court affirmation of Judge Hoffman's actions. First, as the
Supreme Court noted in Jl.foyberry, "it is of course not every attack
on a judge that disqualifies him," 138 and it is at least questionable
whether all the attacks on Judge Hoffman were of the vindictive
quality envisioned by the Court in Mayberry. Second, an appellate
court may hesitate to overrule Judge Hoffman for fear that to do so
will reduce the courts' summary contempt powers and result in a loss
of respect for judicial authority. However, limitations on the arbitrary use of the contempt power do not affect the over-all disciplinary
impact of the threat of a finding of contempt on those who enter the
courtroom. The only difference would be that an adjudication of, and
punishment for, contempt during a trial would be determined by
<1!1other judge. Finally, any deleterious effect that delay may have on
the parent proceedings139 could be minimized if the contemnors are
cited immediately, leaving only the actual adjudication and punishment to await the close of the trial.
The entire tenor of the Dellinger trial, with its constant exchanges
139. Many of the remaining 124 specifications do not clearly involve any vilification
of Judge Hoffman. Some of the contemnors' comments were leveled directly against
the prosecutor. For example, Dellinger was cited for his reaction to a prosecution statement concerning Senators Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy. Specification No. 27 (Dellinger). Id. at 63-64.
137. Id. at 207.
138. 400 U.S. at 465.
139. See, e.g., Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961);
Madnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951); Hallinan v. United States, 182
F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950).
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between the defendants and the judge,140 was such that to allow Judge
Hoffman to adjudicate at least those contempts leveled directly
against him would destroy even the appearance of justice. The defendants exhibited a clear showing of disrespect for Judge Hoffman,
and the disparity in Judge Hoffman's treatment of the defense and
prosecution exemplified his personal involvement in the trial. The
resulting animosity between the defendants and the judge was sufficient, under both Mayberry and Offutt, to require at least a separate
contempt hearing before a different district judge.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 161 contempt citations issued in Dellinger present issues of
constitutional and statutory importance-all of which seem to require that the contempt convictions be reversed. Although the question of the appropriateness of a jury trial in the criminal contempt
setting has been raised on past occasions,141 the Supreme Court has
never addressed itself to the question of exactly how the six-month
standard relates to multiple contempt sentences.142 There are arguments supporting the application of the six-month rule to either each
individual contempt citation or to the aggregate sentence. It is clear,
however, that if the rule is applied only to individual charges a judge
can circumvent the jury trial requirement by simply imposing sentences of less than six months duration and running several contempt
sentences consecutively. The potential for harshness and misuse
inherent in such an interpretation is perhaps the strongest argument
for applying the six-month rule to the aggregate contempt sentence.
Only in this way can the substance of the constitutional right to jury
trial be preserved. Judge Hoffman's decision to utilize summary proceedings under Rule 42(a) instead of conducting a separate hearing
under 42(b) raises what is perhaps a more subtle issue. However, the
Supreme Court has recently addressed itself to this problem and h 1s
resolved it by stating unequivocally that "Rule 42(b) prescribes the
procedural regularity . . . except [in] those unusual situations envisioned by Rule 42(a) where instant action is necessary."148 Thus,
the procedures under Rule 42(b) should have been followed since
immediacy, the linchpin of summary action, was lacking in Dellinger.
Another recent Supreme Court decision, Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,w,
suggests that the contempt citations in Dellinger would have been
140. See TALES, supra note 55, at 16-237.
141. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text.
142. While Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966), held that a sentence
of six months or less would not necessitate a jury trial, some dicta in Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970), hinted that the six-month line may not be definitive.
143. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965).
144. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
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more appropriately handled by another judge145 and that reversal is
required because of Judge Hoffman's "embroilment" in the contemptuous events.
Perhaps even more basic than the statutory and constitutional
issues raised by Dellinger is the question of the appropriateness of
criminal contempt as a sanction at all. In the 1970 case of Illinois v.
Allen,146 the Supreme Court condoned three alternative methods of
dealing with unruly defendants. Under Allen such a defendant may
be cited for contempt, bound and gagged, or removed from the courtroom entirely with the understanding that return is contingent upon
future good behavior.147 The Court noted that physical restraint
within the courtroom should be the last alternative chosen by a judge
since it arouses negative feelings in the jury and defies the very
dignity that the court is attempting to uphold.148 Beyond that
suggestion, the Court in Allen held no apparent preference for any of
the possible sanctions. An immediate sanction, similar to that used in
Allen, may well have been a more appropriate remedy than contempt
for dealing with the defendants' disruptions during the course of the
Dellinger trial. At least such action may have had some deterrent
effect on the contemnors' future behavior, whereas summary action
after the trial had no deterrent value whatsoever. The choice of
sanctions-so long as of the type approved in Allen-appears to be
wholly within the discretion of the trial judge. Once, however, that
choice has been made it is incumbent upon the trial judge to abide
by the various procedures established by the Supreme Court-and, of
course, those set out in the Constitution itself.
145. See notes l!l2-ll7 supra and accompanying text.

146. !197 U.S. !137 (1970). The defendant, on trial for armed robbery, interrupted
the proceedings initially at voir dire by screaming and shouting. After several more
outbreaks the judge had him removed from the courtroom and conditioned his return
upon a promise of good behavior. Approximately halfway through the trial Allen was
allowed to return for the remainder of his trial. 397 U.S. at 339-41.
147. 397 U.S. at 343-44.
148. 397 U.S. at 344.

